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Introduction 
 
The analysis of diffusion processes is interesting under at least two different perspectives. 
First of all, scholars usually concentrate on new products, but it is possible to generalize 
many conclusions to the adoption of new technologies, behaviours, fashions and strategies 
(in the game-theoretic sense), so enlarging the focus significantly. Second, diffusion is in 
essence a multi-disciplinary matter: the literature that has studied the problem spans from 
management to sociology, from psychology to physics including, obviously, alternative 
economic approaches1.  
The literature has discussed both the conditions that favour or hamper diffusion −bringing 
eventually to failure or success− and the speed of diffusion, looking at the factors giving 
rise to different possible patterns, and in particular to an epidemiologic-like S-shaped 
curve. 
A satisfactory picture should be grounded on some essential building blocks. The first one 
is uncertainty: the very novelty of goods (ideas, technologies, behaviours etc.) implies 
that agents must act using conjectures over some unknown feature, as in standard 
Bayesian approaches (Jensen 1982, Feder and O’Mara 1982, Tsur et al. 1990, Chatterjee 
and Eliashberg 1990, Young 2006). The second block is heterogeneity: individual models 
are necessarily different at the outset, since they summarize personal conjectures, 
previous learning and a priori ideas (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Cowan and 
Jonard 2003 and 2004; Lopez Pintado and Watts, 2006). The third block is interaction: 
the learning activity on the part of agents exploits past observations, stemming mainly 
from other agents’ choices. Interaction thus shapes the overall process, making it path 
dependent. Coupling all this with some degree of non-linearity might finally allow for 
multiple equilibria, and hence non-uniqueness of outcomes (lock-in: see Arthur 1994, 
Amable 1992, Agliardi 1998, Aoki and Yoshikawa 2002, Young 2007).  
In Bogliacino and Rampa (2008) we developed a setup, exploiting Bayesian tools, which 
includes risk aversion and the interaction between demand for and supply of a single new 
product. Risk aversion is relevant, because during the learning process the emergence of 
information shapes the confidence of agents (as captured by individual precisions), so 
altering their willingness to pay. Demand-supply interaction allows one to free the 
analysis from the single-sided approach prevailing in the literature2; in addition, this 
allows to model explicitly firms’ uncertainty over demand. 
                                               
1
 The milestone for the literature on diffusion is the Bass model of epidemiologic diffusion pattern (Bass, 
1969). There is a sociological strand of literature focussed on heterogeneity and social effects, e.g. 
Granovetter (1978), Macy (1991), Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993), Valente (1996), Lopez-Pintado and 
Watts (2006). The orthodox Economics literature is more interested in grounding the choice process on 
robust roots, using Bayesian theory (Jensen 1982, Feder and O’Mara 1982, Birkhchandani et al. 1992, 
Bergemann and Välimäki, 1997 Vettas, 1998), but some discussion on more general behaviour rules can be 
found in Nelson et al. (2002) and Geroski (2000). An excellent review is Hall (2005); an overall discussion 
of the properties of diffusion curves under alternative setups is Young (2007). On the physics side, one 
should consider percolation theory as a model of diffusion of ideas and innovations in networks: see e.g. 
Grimmett (1999) and, as an economic application, Duffie and Manso (2006); an econophysics example is 
offered by Yanagita and Onozaki (2008). 
2
 Some noteworthy exceptions are Bergemann and Välimäki (1997) and Vettas (1998). 
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In the present paper we generalize the previous results analyzing a multiple good case, 
abandoning monopoly and moving to monopolistic competition. As in the first paper, we 
provide purely analytical results, characterizing the full set of equilibria of the diffusion 
process together with their stability properties, without relying on simple simulations 
exercises which in the end give only a partial understanding of the overall process.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the demand side, Section 3 the supply 
one, Section 4 presents and discusses the main results, Section 5 concludes. All proofs are 
collected in the Appendix. 
  
 
 
Consumers  
 
The individual consumer j ( Mj K,1= ) maximizes her utility choosing the level of 
consumption of each new good i ( ni K,1= ), over whose qualities she is uncertain. 
Qualities are independent normal variables, with known precision and unknown mean. 
Following a standard Bayesian setting, we assume consumers to be endowed with a prior 
over the unknown mean quality of each good, defined by two hyper-parameters tij ,,µ  and 
tij ,,τ , respectively the mean and the precision (the inverse of the variance, see DeGroot, 
1970) that evolve through time being updated using Bayes’ rule. We assume additively 
separable preferences. From now on t denotes time, ranging discretely from zero onwards.  
We represent the consumer problem in the following way:  
  
max
{x j ,i ,t } i =1,K,n
E[U(x j,i,t ,λ i) |µ j ,i,t−1, τ j,i,t−1] = E[ u
i=1
n
∑ (x j ,i,t ) f (λ i) |µ j,i,t−1,τ j,i,t−1] (1) 
such that  wxp
n
i
tijti ≤∑
=1
,,,
 
where w is the income endowment, for simplicity equal in time and through all 
consumers3.  
The function f (⋅) is the way the quality of each good is incorporated into agents’ 
preferences. In particular, as in the single good framework of Bogliacino and Rampa 
(2008), we assume that U satisfies (i) 0
,,
2
>∂∂
∂
itijx
U
λ , meaning that the consumer wishes to 
purchase more if quality is higher, for given price; and (ii) ( ) 02
,,
3
<
∂∂
∂
itijx
U
λ
, i.e. consumers 
are risk averse in quality4: this suggests that a higher variance of quality tends to depress 
(expected) marginal utility and hence consumption, for given price. 
                                               
3
 In (1) agents take expectations with respect to all the available information at time t, which obviously 
includes the information revealed by the market in the previous period, thus we use the time subscript t-1. 
The reason will become clear in a while. 
4
 In the standard choice theory, risk aversion is deemed as negativity of the second derivative. In our setup, 
this property obviously holds for quality, since u(⋅) is strictly increasing and the utility function U is 
multiplicatively separable in quality and quantity. However, we preferred to present this characteristic in 
terms of third cross-derivative, because we want to stress the implication for the quantity purchased.  
 4 
As in Bogliacino and Rampa (2008), we posit u(⋅) = (⋅)δ , and f (λi) = A − exp(−λi); we 
assume in addition λi ~ N(µi,r) , due to random production and/or delivery factors, where 
the true mean µi is unknown, and r is known, to consumers; the different qualities are 
statistically independent. The individual prior, defined over the mean of each quality, is 
also assumed normal, which allows us to use the properties of the conjugate family. The 
advantage of these assumptions is threefold: first, they satisfy the two conditions (i-ii) 
above; second, they allow us to “pass through” the expected value operator using the fact 
that, owing to normality and to the exponential, f (λi)  is log-normal; finally, they imply, 
as we shall see, that consumers are not bound to buy a positive quantity of each good. 
This last property is useful to study the effects of noisy quality signals on consumers’ 
choices, addressing the possibility of lock-in, i.e. the failure of a diffusion of a “good” 
product5. 
As regards the timing of events, the consumer makes her choice at time t using all 
information available at that time, which is captured through her posterior, and before 
knowing the others’ choices at t. All the new information refers then to choices made at 
t−1, hence the hyper-parameters relevant for the choice at t are 1,, −tijµ  and 1,, −tijτ .  
  
Standard maximization implies the following individual demand curve:  
x j,i,t =
pi,t
1/(δ−1) δ A − exp −µ j,i,t−1 +
τ j,i,t−1 + r
2
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 
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n
∑
w  (2) 
where one must intend 0
,,
=tijx  whenever ( ) 0exp ≤⋅−A 6. If ( ) 0exp >⋅−A , we say that 
consumer j is active on market i at time t. 
The interpretation is straightforward: each consumer spends a share of its total income on 
good i, depending on the ratio of its price-quality term to that of the whole bundle of 
goods. Total actual market demand for good i, DtiQ , , is simply the summation over the j 
index. 
After buying the chosen quantity, each active consumer receives a quality signal that she 
publicly announces to all consumers: these signals are used by each of them to update her 
conjecture. Using the properties of conjugate families (DeGroot, 1970), the posterior 
parameters for the normal-normal couple (respectively, the likelihood and the prior) are 
calculated  simply as:  
titijtij
titij
tititijtij
tij rM
rM
rM
,1,,,,
,1,,
,,1,,1,,
,,
, +=
+
+
=
−
−
−− ττ
τ
λµτµ  (3) 
                                               
5
 A utility function similar to that used in the present setup was proposed also by Roberts and Urban (1988), 
who however did not explore analytically the dynamic implications of learning and of demand-supply 
interaction, limiting themselves to simulations exercises. 
6
 In fact, although the sub-utility u(⋅) = (⋅)δ satisfies Inada conditions, when this condition holds, the per-
period utility becomes negative, except if the quantity is zero: thus not buying becomes the rational choice. 
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where ti,λ  is the quality sample mean, computed from the announced perceived qualities, 
and MM ti ≤,  is the number of active buyers at date t. Notice that consumers treat 
qualities as independent, and update their conjectures accordingly (that is, separately for 
each good). 
The above equation simply tells us that consumers average their own prior opinions and 
the sample mean of quality from the new observations, the weight being the relative 
precisions of the two measures. Moreover, through time individual precisions grow 
linearly: as one can imagine, given the assumptions of quality-risk-aversion, this fact 
tends to raise demand in time, due to a simple informational effect.   
 
 
Firms  
 
Firms interact in monopolistic competition, each producing a new good at a constant 
marginal cost c i: since each firm corresponds to a different product, as in standard 
monopolistic competition, we use the i index to define a firm. Every firm is uncertain over 
its own demand. To make things as simple as possible, we assume that it conjectures a 
linear demand defined by two parameters: more precisely, given the price tip , , firm i 
believes that its demand is a random normal variable with mean tiiiti pbaQ ,, −=  and 
precision equal to 1. In addition, firm i does not know ia  and ib , and maintains the 
hypothesis that the distribution of the two parameters is a normal bivariate: the mean and 
the precision hyper-parameters of this distribution at date t are as follows7: 








=








=
titi
titi
ti
ti
ti
ti
γγ
γγ
β
α
,2,,21,
,12,,1,
,
,
,
,
, Γm  (4) 
 
where tiγ ,1,  and tiγ ,2, are positive. Since the firm has surely no reason to conjecture any 
particular initial value for the correlation among the two mean hyper-parameters, we 
assume 00,21,0,12, == ii γγ . Define also 2,1,0,,, =≡ kkiki γγ  as the firm’s initial precisions of 
the mean parameters.  
As in the consumer case, the timing is as follows: the firm announces the price before 
observing demand, hence it uses its  (t−1)-conjecture, formed observing demand at time 
t−1. The firm chooses the price so as to maximize expected profit. Therefore, from 
standard First Order Condition in monopoly, the price announced at date t is: 
 pi,t =
α i,t−1
2βi,t−1
+
c i
2
 (5) 
and expects the following demand:  
                                               
7
 This derives from our assumption that the conditional distribution of tiQ ,  has known precision equal to 1; 
if this precision were different from 1, the precision matrix ti,Γ  would be multiplied by its value. Things 
could be generalized, but this would be immaterial for our results, since firm’s expected profit does not 
depend on precisions, given risk neutrality.  
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ti
c
pQ βα  (6) 
We neglect any capacity constraint, and assume that the firm can meet all demand8.  
The updating process on the part of firm i follows, again, standard Bayesian rules: using 
primes to denote transposed vectors, define the row vector ]1['
,, titi p−≡x . Given our 
assumptions, one has (DeGroot, 1970, Chapter 11): 
][][
,1,1,1,
1
1,1,1,,
D
titititititititi Q−−−−−−− +′+= xmΓxxΓm  (7) 
and 
][ 1,1,1,, −−− ′+= titititi xxΓΓ  (8) 
By simple algebra, (7) can be rewritten as: 
)]([][
)]()[(][
])[(][
1,1,,1,
1
1,1,1,1,
1,1,,1,1,1,1,1,
1
1,1,1,
,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,
1
1,1,1,,
−−−
−
−−−−
−−−−−−−
−
−−−
−−−−−−−
−
−−−
′−′++=
=′−+′+′+=
=+′−′+′+=
titi
D
titititititi
titi
D
tititititititititi
D
titititititititititititi
Q
Q
Q
mxxxxΓm
mxxmxxΓxxΓ
xmxxxxΓxxΓm
 (9) 
In a nutshell, the above expression tells us that the new mean parameters are equal to the 
previous period’s ones, plus a correction term depending the prediction error9 and 
adjusted for the new precision matrix.  
 
 
Equilibria: Main Results  
 
The system can be fully characterized in terms of firms’ and consumers’ hyper-
parameters.  
Define ]...[
,,,1,, ′= tnjtjtj µµµ  and ]...[ ,,,1,, ′= tnjtjtj τττ  as the vectors of consumer j’s hyper-
parameters at time t. Then define ]...[
,,1 ′′′= tMtt µµµ   and ]...[ ,,1 ′′′= tMtt τττ  for all 
consumers. As regards firms, call ][
,2,,21,,12,,1,, ′= tititititi γγγγγ  the vectorization of the 
precision matrix of firm i’s conjecture at time t; posit finally ]...[
,,1 ′′′= tntt γγγ , and 
]...[
,,1 ′′′= tntt mmm . 
Defining ]'[ ttttt γmτµy ′′′′= , we compact all the updating equations10 in the following 
system of nnM 62 +  first order difference equations: 
)( 1−= tt F yy  (10) 
                                               
8
 An interesting aspect of our setup is the possibility of analysing disequilibrium processes leaving its main 
features unaltered. In fact, assuming for instance production lags, i.e. the need for the firms to decide 
quantity and price, then equilibrium, as defined short below, is also a market equilibrium in the standard 
sense. From (9) it is clear that all that is needed to discuss the disequilibrium path and the convergence to a 
market equilibrium is the possibility for firms to observe the true demand for given price in each period and 
to adjust supply accordingly, e.g. through the use of inventories. However this full characterization is 
beyond the scope of the present paper, being a question more related to discussion of the features of a 
general equilibrium. 
9
 Notice in fact that 1,1, −−′ titi mx  is expected demand, given the prior. 
10
 Taking account of (2) and (5). 
 7 
which completely describes the learning and diffusion dynamics. 
Risk aversion on the part of consumers makes them sensitive to all piece of information 
available: as time goes by, new information can increase precisions and raise their 
demand, ceteris paribus. For this reason the system shows path dependence and 
irreversibility. The relevant equilibrium concept is thus a steady state one, meaning the 
agents’ conjectures remain fixed in time. We use in fact a conjectural equilibrium notion: 
a conjectural equilibrium is a fixed point of  (10). 
One might think that a conjectural equilibrium requires that all consumers have 
necessarily learnt the true qualities of the goods. In fact, if new information keeps 
arriving, the Law of Large Numbers implies that consumers are bound to learn the true 
qualities. It is also possible, however, that consumers are endowed initially with 
pessimistic conjectures about one of the goods, so demanding a null quantity of it: a null 
demand, in turn, implies that no signal will arrive at next date, and conjectures remain 
unchanged (lock-in). More importantly, it might happen that, even starting from a positive 
demand at date t, a highly biased signal switches demand off at date 1+t : we term 
“failure” this phenomenon.  
As regards this last point, we recall one of the results of Bogliacino and Rampa (2008).  
Proposition 1. Suppose that demand for good i is positive at time t. Then, there exists 
positive probability of failure of the i-th product at time t + 1.  
 
Proof. See Bogliacino and Rampa (2008), Proposition 1. 
 
The argument runs as follows: at every time t we can build a complete ordering over the 
set of consumers in terms of a function of their mean and precision hyper-parameters: the 
higher its value, the higher a consumer’s ‘optimism’. If a signal is such biased as to drive 
the most optimistic consumer below a certain threshold (recall that A < exp(−λi) implies 
no purchase), then all demand is driven to zero. But then no information is made available 
to update conjectures, and consumers are locked-in at zero demand11. 
We come now to a different set of results, assuming that failure does not occur. In this 
case a conjectural equilibrium is a situation in which consumers’ conjectured means have 
converged to the true mean qualities, and in addition firms’ conjectures are confirmed by 
the true demands, so that prediction errors are zero and firms’ conjectures remain 
unchanged at subsequent dates12. We can fix the ideas taking jiitji ,,,, ∀= µµ , and 
studying the dynamics in expected value terms13, i.e. with the signals always equal to the 
true qualities, so that demands stay constant for given prices (and consumers’ precisions 
are free to diverge as in the standard Bayesian setting). 
This given, define  
( )[ ] 1,,1,,,1, ',)( −−− −= titiititiDtitii pQg mxmm µ   
as the excess of actual demand over expected one for good i; thus the equilibrium 
condition can be written as follows: 
                                               
11
 One can also, as in Bogliacino and Rampa (2008), study the diffusion dynamics and microfound logistic 
or concave diffusion patterns depending on initial consumer conjectures, an aim which is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
12
 See (9). 
13
 With respect to the true distribution of µi. 
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0mmm == )]'(...)([)(
,,11 tnntt ggg , (11) 
a set of n equations. Then the following Proposition holds.  
Proposition 2. There exists a n-dimensional equilibrium manifold in the space of firms’ 
parameters. 
Proof. Trivial: (11) is a system of n equations in 2n variables. 
 
Conjectural equilibria, then, form a continuum: there is not a unique steady state that can 
be attained by the system.  
A natural questions is now the stability of equilibria along the manifold. Given the 
continuum, we must speak of Lyapunov stability: that is, stable equilibria are not 
asymptotically (locally) stable, since a small displacement from one stable equilibrium to 
another does not cause convergence back to the former. In addition, in the case of 
stability, different initial conditions lead to different final states. 
We study stability of equilibria at any finite time, recalling that we are assuming 
jiitji ,,,, ∀= µµ  and are working in expected values. Hence the stability of equilibria 
depends entirely on the firms’ parameters: indeed we can prove the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. The equilibria where conjectured demand is more elastic than the true one 
are locally unstable.  
 
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An equilibrium where conjectured demand is more elastic than the true one. 
 
The intuition for this result can be seen using Figure 1. A possible equilibrium position is 
A, where the firm maximizes profits, given its conjecture, and there is no prediction error. 
From the definition of equilibrium, price and quantity are common to both the true and 
the conjectured demand, so the condition of Proposition 3 implies that the derivative of 
the conjectured demand is higher (in absolute value) than that of true demand. On the 
 9 
contrary, a B-like equilibrium is one where the true demand is less rigid than the 
conjectured one. 
Look at expression (9), and at how it can be rewritten according to Appendix A.2: in the 
presence of excess demand a firm updates its parameters in such a way that the α 
parameter grows and the β parameter decreases14. Hence, using (5), it follows that firm 
will raise its price at the subsequent date. The opposite holds in the presence of excess 
supply. 
Consider now what is happening in a neighbourhood of A; a higher (resp. smaller) price, 
such as hp  (resp. lp ) generates excess supply (resp. demand), thus inducing the firm to 
raising (resp. lowering) further its price. It is then apparent that the system moves away 
from the A equilibrium. A similar reasoning for a B-like equilibrium shows that in this 
case there can exist a basin of attraction (unless there is overshooting, a possibility shown 
by Proposition 4 below). This type of instability is obviously local, since we can only 
study linear approximations. 
  
In a B-like equilibrium we could still observe local instability at some finite time, 
instability being of the oscillatory type. This property, however, is smoothed by the 
passing of time and the instability is rapidly reabsorbed. In fact we have the following 
Proposition. 
  
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium where the true elasticity is high and the demand 
conjectured by a single firm is more rigid than the true one, there can exist oscillatory 
instability as long as t is small, and provided that the firms’ initial precisions are low.  
 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
 
Under the condition of this Proposition, if the system starts in a neighbourhood of some 
equilibrium the variables will be pushed away from it, and, given the continuum of 
equilibria, the location of the steady state depends on initial conditions. Observe however 
that the same unstable equilibria are turned into stable ones by the passing of time, that 
has the effect of increasing firms’ precisions, as apparent from the proof of Proposition 4. 
 
We can finally add some further results in terms of welfare. In Bogliacino and Rampa 
(2008), studying a single firm, we analyzed the relation between welfare and stability 
along the equilibrium manifold. In the present context the higher dimensionality makes 
things more complex: it is not so easy to identify how individual parameters change 
together along the manifold; and we cannot block n-1 firms, trying to concentrate on a 
single one, since changing one price implies obviously changes in all expenditure shares. 
We leave this point for further research. 
Our multiple-good setup, however, allows us to analyze the degree of diversification of 
the decentralized economy and its welfare properties, although under some stricter 
                                               
14
 In A.1 it is shown that (9) is equivalent to ( )⋅+=
− itititi gCmm ,1,, , where 










+
+
=
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tptp
pd
i
titi
ti
i
titi
1,
,,
,
2,
,,
γ
γ
C , 
0
,
>tid , ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]′⋅−⋅≡⋅ iii ggg , and ( )⋅ig  was defined before expression (11) above: see (16) and (23) in 
that Appendix. As a consequence, one can easily check that if ( ) 0>⋅ig , that is, if true demand exceeds 
conjectured demand, then the first element of ( )⋅iti gC ,  is positive, while the second is negative. 
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assumptions. This is a fairly standard procedure in Monopolistic Competition literature: 
we need to endogenize the number of firms (i.e. the number of varieties) by means of a 
fixed cost of entry (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Tirole, 1988; Bertoletti et al. 2008), then 
free entry implies a zero profit condition, which closes the model. Indeed, the following 
Proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 5. In equilibrium with endogenous number of firms (assuming a positive 
fixed cost of entry) and identical marginal cost and qualities of goods, there is over (resp. 
under) diversification, if for the marginal firms −defined as that who fix the price at the 
lowest level in equilibrium− the true elasticity is greater (resp. lower) than the 
conjectured one.  
 
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
 
The interpretation is fairly obvious. Define Tε  and Cε  to be the true elasticity and that 
conjectured by firms: when the full information case is characterised by efficiency, εT
εC
>1 
in equilibrium makes firms less able to appropriate surplus, pushing entry. The opposite 
holds for 1<
C
T
ε
ε
. Thus, interestingly, not only the case 
C
T
ε
ε
 is stable, as in Bogliacino and 
Rampa (2008) and in the present case: it is also efficient in terms of diversification. 
 
A caveat about this result: it is partly dependent on the particular form of the utility 
function. In general, the relation between the optimal degree of diversification and that 
prevailing under perfect information depends on how consumers’ preferences affect the 
mark-up, since the latter is related to the ability of firms to appropriate the surplus (see 
Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). In our case, the iso-elastic assumption guarantees efficiency. 
However in the general case the ratio among the true elasticity and the conjectured one 
still allows us to characterize over and under diversification with respect to the perfect 
information case; of course one cannot say any longer that the degree of diversification 
under perfect information is also optimal.  
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This work studies a monopolistic competitive market, where firms innovate introducing 
new products and are uncertain about demand; at the same time, consumers are 
heterogeneous in their expectations on quality, which they are uncertain about. There is 
interaction in time among and between the market sides: this interaction shapes the 
learning process and the final pattern observed. This setup is fruitful, in that it allows for 
the analysis of diffusion, failure, dynamic stability and welfare. Heterogeneity, interaction 
and non-linearity can coexist with analytical tractability: indeed, we are able to 
characterize analytically the set of equilibria and their stability properties.  
Further research includes the use of more sophisticated firms (oligopoly or conjectural 
variations models) and the characterization of the welfare properties along the manifold. 
Of course the model could be simulated to study different diffusion curves and how final 
outcomes depend on initial conditions. 
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Appendix 
 
 
A.1. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
The system is highly non-linear, so we should limit ourselves to discuss local stability, using a 
linear approximation in a neighbourhood of one equilibrium. The Jacobian matrix of )( 1−= tt F yy  
is easily checked to be the following one: 
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where kI  is the k-identity matrix and pk ,0 is a k-by-p null matrix. 
The stability condition is that all the eigenvalues of J, evaluated at an equilibrium, do not lie 
outside the unit circle. We need some preliminary results. 
 
Claim 1. At an equilibrium, the eigenvalues of J are those of the four blocks along its main 
diagonal. 
Proof. We need simply to prove that 0
γ
m
=
∂
∂
−1t
t
. Define first 
[ ] ),(1 1,1,,
,
2
,
,
1,,,1, −−−− ≡


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D
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D
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Q
Q
p
Q
τµmgmB
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mxx
 (14) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]′⋅−⋅≡⋅ iii ggg  and ( )⋅ig  was defined before expression (11). Define finally 
)()],([),( 1,,11,1,,1,1,, −−−−−− ≡ titititititititi mBmΓAmΓC  (15) 
Summing up, firm i’s updating formula can be written as 
)(),( 1,1,1,,1,, −−−− += tiitititititi mgmΓCmm  (16) 
and the block which interests us now is: 
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which is clearly equal to zero, since from (11) ( ) 0=⋅ig  in equilibrium, and the ig ’s themselves do 
not depend on firms’ precisions. QED 
 
We can thus concentrate on the four principal blocks of J. The NW block has eigenvalues lower 
than one, and tending to one as time goes to infinity: they are the weights attached to consumers’ 
prior means in the updating formulae: see (3) above. The second and fourth blocks give rise to 
respectively nM and 4n eigenvalues equal to one: they relate to the updating of consumers’ and 
firms’ precisions, and are immaterial for stability. In fact changes in the precisions do not affect 
the equilibrium itself, being more important in the initial, rather than the final, phases of the 
learning process (Rampa, 1989). 
We are thus left with the 2n eigenvalues of the block 





∂
∂
−1t
t
m
m
. 
Claim 2. The eigenvalues of 





∂
∂
−1t
t
m
m
 are as follows: 
(i) n eigenvalues are equal to one, implied by the continuum of equilibria; 
(ii) the other n eigenvalues are equal to 1GDρ +)( tt , where ( )⋅ρ  is the column vector of the 
eigenvalues of the argument, 1 is a column vector of ones, tD  is a diagonal matrix with positive 
diagonal elements, and tG  is a matrix with positive extra-diagonal elements. 
 
Proof  
(i) Define the following matrix: 














=
tn
t
t
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...
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00C
C  (18) 
and 
])(...)([ 111 ′′′= −− tnt mgmgg . (19) 
Given (16), and given that ( ) 0=⋅ig  in equilibrium, one deduces: 


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
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
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 (20) 
This matrix has 2n eigenvalues equal to 1 plus those of the second term. Since by construction 
( )⋅g  is formed by 2n terms, n of which are the opposite of the remaining n, 





∂
∂
−1tm
g
 has rank n, 
and the same is generically true for 





∂
∂
−1t
t
m
gC : hence the latter has n eigenvalues equal to zero. 
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Thus, we can conclude that n eigenvalues of 





∂
∂
−1t
t
m
m
 are unitary. These n unitary eigenvalues 
correspond precisely to the very existence of the n-dimensional continuum of equilibria: a move 
along this continuum is followed neither by divergence nor by convergence to the previous point. 
This completes the proof of part (i) of Claim 2. 
 
(ii) In order to study the remaining n eigenvalues of 
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gC , we can write: 
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Each of the diagonal blocks of matrix Ct , in turn, can be written15 as: 
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 for ∞<t  , and recalling that 2,1,0,,, =≡ kkiki γγ .  
                                               
15
 See Bogliacino and Rampa (2008), expression C.2 of the Appendix. 
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Hence, the product 





∂
∂
−1t
t
m
gC  is easily seen to be a 2n-by-n matrix composed by n-by-n column 
vectors of the following form: 
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As a result of (22)-(24), the product 
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We can thus write the expression: 
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where tD  is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements. 
We need now to prove that the extra-diagonal elements of the matrix 








∂
∂
≡
tk
i
t p
g
,
G  are positive. 
Using the definition of ( )⋅ig  after expression (14), one can see that the elements outside the main 
diagonal of tG  are the derivatives of the demand w.r.t. prices of the other goods (
∂x i
∂pk
, i ≠ k ). 
Remind that the consumer’s problem is: 
∑ ∑
= =
≤
n
i
n
i
iiii wxptsfxu
1 1
..)()(max λ  (27) 
whose first order condition is (calling z the Lagrange multiplier): 
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k
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Thus we have: 
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Simple manipulation of the numerator above, in particular using the Inverse Function Theorem, 
shows that the numerator itself is negative as long as: 
( )( ) 1'' ' **
*
>
ii
i
xxu
xu
 (31) 
where *ix  is a solution to (28). With additively separable preferences the LHS is nothing else than 
the elasticity of demand (Bertoletti et al., 2008), so (31) is certainly satisfied with our 
formulation16 ( ) δxxu = . So (30) is negative, and we can conclude that ki
p
x
k
i ≠>
∂
∂
,0 . This 
completes the proof of Claim 2. QED 
 
 
Claim 3. If at an equilibrium the elasticity of the conjectured demand is greater than the elasticity 
of the true demand, ttGD  has at least one positive eigenvalue. 
Proof 
As we said, the elements of tD  are positive for t < ∞ . From the definition of ( )⋅ig   and from (26) 
it follows that the i-th element along the main diagonal of tG  can be written as 
dDemandConjecturei
i
TrueDemandi
i
i
i
p
x
p
x
p
g
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
   (32) 
By definition of elasticity, using the fact that at an equilibrium the price-quantity couple is the 
same for the true and the conjectured demand, the assumption of Claim 3 is equivalent to  
0<
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
dDemandConjecturei
i
TrueDemandi
i
p
x
p
x
. (33) 
Since both true and conjectured demand are negatively sloped, (33) implies that (32) is positive. 
Using the results of Claim 2, part (ii), the fact that (29) is positive, and finally the fact that tD  is a 
positive diagonal matrix, we conclude that all elements of ttGD  are positive. Claim 3 then 
follows from the Perron-Frobenius Theorem17. QED 
 
We can finally complete the proof of Proposition 2. From Claim 3 and Claim 2, part (ii), it 
follows that 





∂
∂
−1t
t
m
m
 has an eigenvalue greater than one. Claim 1 says that the eigenvalues of 






∂
∂
−1t
t
m
m
 are also eigenvalues of J; hence J has an eigenvalue greater than one.  QED 
                                               
16
 Indeed one can argue that the property is completely general, since a firm will never find optimal to fix a 
price where the elasticity of demand is lower than one. However, this condition is true only for conjectured 
demand, and not for the true one. 
17
 See Lancaster-Tismenetsky (1985), Theorem 1 on page 536. 
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 4 
Using Claim 2, part (ii), we need to prove that ttGD  can have a real eigenvalue lower than −1. In 
what follows we will drop the time subscripts for easiness of notation, writing DG  instead of 
ttGD : in fact we are evaluating the jacobian matrix J at an equilibrium (all consumers have 
converged to the true quality value and prices are fixed at the equilibrium values). We start once 
more from some preliminary results. 
 
Claim 4. The following statements hold: 
i) G  is symmetric, and one has 21 GGG += , where 1G is diagonal and 2G has rank 1; 
ii) DG  has the same eigenvalues as 2/12/1 GDD ; 
iii) 2/122/112/12/1 DGDDGGDD += . 
 
Proof 
(i) To find the elements of matrix G, we differentiate the equilibrium conditions (11) w.r.t. prices, 
using the definition of demand (3) and imposing equilibrium condition. We get: 
( ) ( )
( )




≠>
−
=
∂
∂
=
−
++
−
=∂
∂
kiQ
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Q
p
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pp
g
D
k
D
i
k
i
D
i
D
i
i
D
i
ii
i
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
δ
δ
δ
δβδ
 (34) 
which implies that G  is symmetric18.  
Hence, 21 GGG += : the first matrix is a diagonal matrix with elements ( ) i
D
i
i
Q
p
βδ +−1
1
, and 
QQG ′
−
=
Mw
1
12 δ
δ
, where Q is the vector of equilibrium quantities. But the non-zero 
eigenvalues of 2G  are the same as those of QQ'
1
1 Mwδ
δ
−
, so 2G  has rank 1. 
(ii) We know from Claim 2, part ii, that D  is diagonal and non singular, thus it admits 2/1D . But 
DG  is similar to 2/12/12/12/1 )( GDDDDGD =− , and the two matrices have the same eigenvalues. 
(iii) Given part (i) above, and since diagonal matrices commute, one can write 
2/1
2
2/1
1
2/1
2
2/12/1
1
2/12/12/1 DGDDGDGDDGDGDD +=+=  (35) 
where the first term is a diagonal matrix, while the second term is 
Mw
1
1 δ
δ
−
 times the external 
product of QD 2/1  and itself, hence is symmetric. QED 
 
                                               
18
 The ki
p
g
k
i ≠
∂
∂
, , are equal to the extra-diagonal terms of the Jacobian of the demand functions, thus in 
the general case symmetry holds only for compensated demands (see Theorem 1: McKenzie, 2002, p. 10), 
and not for the Marshallian ones, because of income effects (McKenzie, 2002, p. 12). However the 
condition holds under our present assumptions.  
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Define now the following terms: iφ , as the i-th element of the main diagonal of D; 
2
1
i
i
i γ
γν ≡ , as 
the ratio between firm i’s initial precisions; and 
i
T
is ε
ε
≡ , as the ratio between the true elasticity 
and the conjectured elasticity in the market for product i. We proceed with the following 
 
 
Claim 5. The following statements hold: 
(i) the eigenvalues of 1DG are ( ) ( ) nipt
p
s
iii
i
ii
i ,,1,1
111
2
11 2
1
2
K=
++






++
−
νγ
ε
ν
 (36) 
(ii) the non zero eigenvalue of 2/122/1 DGD  is ( )∑ ∑














++






++
k kkk
k
kk
k
k
kk
kk
pt
p
sQp
Qp
2
1
2
1
111
2
1
νγ
ε
ν
δ  (37) 
 
Proof 
(i) We concentrate first on the i-diagonal element of the diagonal matrix D, iφ . From the 
definitions after (23) we have ( )21221
12
1
2
2
1
2 iiiii
i
i
iii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i pt
p
p
d
γγγγ
β
αγγ
βγβ
αγ
βφ ++
+
=





+= . From (5) one 
deduces in addition that ii
i
i cp −= 2β
α
, hence one can write ( ) iiii
i
i
i pcppp −+=
2
β
α
. But the 
monopoly pricing rule (Tirole, 1988) is that the Lerner Index is equal to the inverse of the 
conjectured elasticity, whence ( )
i
i
ii
p
cp
ε
=− ; then we have 
i
i
i
i
i
i
ppp
εβ
α 22 +=  . Given the 
definition 
2
1
i
i
i γ
γ
ν ≡ , we get thus ( )21
2
1
111
2
1
iii
i
ii
i
i pt
p
νγ
ε
ν
βφ ++






++
= .  
Now, recall from the proof of Claim 4, part (i), that the i-diagonal element of the diagonal matrix 
1G  is  ( ) iii Qp βδ +−1
1
. In equilibrium one has ( ) iiii cpQ β−= , which is equal to i
i
ip β
ε
 by the 
monopoly pricing rule. Using the true elasticity δε −= 1
1
T  and the definition 
i
T
is ε
ε
≡ , we obtain 
( ) ( )iiiii sQp −=+− 11
1 ββδ . 
The i-th diagonal element of  the diagonal matrix 1DG , that is its i-th eigenvalue, is then equal to   
( ) iii s φβ −1 . Substituting the value of iφ  found above, we get (36). 
 
(ii) Using Claim 4, we write 2/12/12/122/1
1
1
DQQDDGD ′
−
=
Mwδ
δ
, a matrix that has rank 1 and 
thus a single non-zero eigenvalue. It is easily checked that this matrix has the same non-zero 
eigenvalue as, ∑
−
=′
− k
kkQMwMw
21
1
1
1
φδ
δ
δ
δ DQQ . Exploit again the equilibrium fact 
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( ) kkkk cpQ β−= , the monopoly pricing rule ( )
k
k
kk
p
cp
ε
=− , and the definitions 
k
T
ks ε
ε
≡  and 
δε −= 1
1
T , which together imply kkkkk spQQ βδ =−
2
1
1
. Substituting finally the value of iφ  found 
in part (i) above, and using the budget constraint ∑=
k
kkQpMw , one gets (37). QED 
 
We will use the following result, which we call Claim 6. 
Claim 6. If A and B are two symmetric matrices and if 1)(rank =B , then the i-th eigenvalue of 
A+B, say )( BA +iρ , is equal to ( )BA ρρ ⋅+ ii m)( , where [ ]1,0∈im , and ( )Bρ  is the only non-
zero eigenvalue of B. 
 
Proof. See Wilkinson (1965), pp. 97-98. QED 
 
 
We are finally ready to complete the proof of Proposition 4, stating that an eigenvalue of J, say 
( )Jiρ , can be lower than −1. By Claim 2, part (ii), this means ( ) 2−<DGiρ . We will posit 
sufficient conditions for this result. 
We know from Claim 4 that DG  has the same eigenvalues as 2/12/1 GDD , and that 
2/1
2
2/1
1
2/12/1 DGDDGGDD += , the sum of two symmetric matrices. Claim 5, in turn, gives 
expressions for the eigenvalues of 2/12
2/1
1 and DGDDG . Claim 6 asserts finally that =)(DGiρ  
( )2/122/11)( DGDDG ρρ ⋅+ ii m , with [ ]1,0∈im , implying ( )2/122/11)()( DGDDGDG ρρρ +≤ ii . 
Suppose now that the true elasticity Tε  is very high, implying 1≈δ  (recall that 1<δ  anyway), 
and that all firms but the i-th one conjecture an elasticity kε  very near to the true one, while the i-
th firm conjectures a low elasticity iε . This implies 1≈ks  and 01 ≈
kε
 for all ik ≠ ; at the same 
time, the i-th firm will price very high, so that (2) implies a low share of consumers’ expenditure 
on good i; in addition, is  is very high. Suppose further that all firms have low initial precisions of 
their α parameters, so that 1kγ  is near to zero, k∀ . Finally, consider the system at the very start of 
the learning process, meaning 1=t . Looking carefully at (37), all this implies that 
( ) 212/122/1 ≈DGDρ .   
This given, Claim 6 ca be written as ( )
2
1
1
111
2
11)( 2
2
+
+






++
−≤
ii
i
ii
ii p
p
s
ν
ε
ν
ρ DG  for the i-th 
eigenvalue of DG. 
We need to have ( ) 2
2
1
1
111
2
11 2
2
−<+
+






++
−
ii
i
ii
i p
p
s
ν
ε
ν
, meaning ( ) 5
1
111
1 2
2
−<
+






++
−
ii
i
ii
i p
p
s
ν
ε
ν
. This 
might well be the case, given our current assumptions of a low iε  and a high is , and if in addition 
one assumes that iν  is high, i.e. firm i is initially more uncertain on the β parameter than on the α 
parameter. Notice that, as time passes ( 1>t ) and hence 1kγ  grows above zero, the result does not 
hold any longer. 
 
This completes the proof of Proposition 4. QED 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5 
 
 
Let introduce a fixed cost of entry equal to F. In order to calculate the optimal degree of 
diversification, we need to fix price equal to marginal cost, introduce lump sum taxation for an 
amount 
M
nF
 for each consumer (reducing her income to 
M
nF
w − ) and maximize the indirect 
utility function in n.  The demand for goods of identical quality is:  
[ ]
[ ] np
MFnwM
fnp
fpMFnwMQD )(
)(
)()( )1/(1)1/(
)1/(1)1/(1
−
=−=
−
−
−
−
δδδ
δδ
λδ
λδ
 (38) 
Replacing the price equal to marginal cost, the indirect utility function is given by 
δδδδ )/(1 MnFwMcn −−− , which must be maximized in n, considered as a real variable for 
simplicity. The first order condition is also sufficient, due to the strict concavity of the indirect 
utility function, and is the following: 
T
e
F
MwFMwn
ε
δ =−= /)1(  (39) 
The equilibrium condition with endogenous number of firms is a zero profit condition for the 
marginal firm, defined by the price }|min{ *iii pppp ==  (where *ip  are equilibrium prices), 
given the equality of marginal cost and quality through firms (and convergence of consumers’ 
conjectures in equilibrium). Hence: 
F
pn
MwcFQcp =−=− β
βα
2
)(  (40) 
By simple algebra we get 
CF
Mw
F
Mw
c
c
n
εβα
βα
=
+
−
=
*
 (41) 
Over (respectively under) diversification is the case enn >*  (respectively enn <* ). Replacing 
with (39) and (41) completes the proof.  QED 
